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LOTUS LEAVES SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT IN A DREAM
STATE: DEFINING PROTECTION OF THE USER
INTERFACE FOLLOWING LOTUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.
V. PAPERBACK SOFTWARE INTERNATIONAL
I. INTRODUCTION
Under copyright infringement analysis, computer programs are
composed of two elements: (1) literal elements, which are the actual
commands spelled out by the computer programmer;' and, (2) non-lit-
eral elements, which are the displayed result of the computer executing
the literal commands.2 Traditionally, courts have afforded copyright
protection to all literal elements of programs, but only to certain non-
literal elements such as the structure, sequence and organization of the
program.' Because non-literal elements are only apparent when a pro-
gram is operating, such elements pose difficult copyright issues for
courts.
In Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International,
4
the District Court of Massachusetts held that copyright protection in the
plaintiff's popular "Lotus 1-2-3" spreadsheet program extended to ele-
ments of the "user interface."' Lotus has been a closely watched decision
with strong implications for the future of copyright development.'
Software has intrinsic utilitarian aspects and functional require-
ments not found in most other forms of expression protected by copy-
right.7 If the breadth of copyright protection is extended too far, it will
be difficult for software developers to improve programs created by other
developers, and easy for software developers to create monopolies.' On
1. See infira notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
3. Eg., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1224-25 (3d Cir.
1986) (held copyright protection of computer program extended beyond literal elements of
program code and included non-literal elements of structure, sequence and organization of
program), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
4. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
5. Id. at 68. The court adopted the plaintiff's description of the "user interface," which
included such elements as the menus, including their structure and organization, the "long
prompts" that appear at the bottom of the menu further describing the menu choices, "the
screens on which they appear, the function key assignments, [and] the macro commands" and
macro language found within the plaintiff's program. Id. at 63. See infra notes 69, 83 for
further definition and explanation of the user interface and macro commands.
6. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
8. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 52-53.
1301
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
the other hand, if the breadth of protection is too narrow, investments in
the development of new programs will not be protected, thereby stifling
advancements. 9
This Note examines the Lotus court's analysis of prior copyright
protection afforded computer programs and its application to this case.
The author offers a modification of the analysis using existing case au-
thority that would have more clearly defined the scope of copyright pro-
tection for program developers. Finally, the author urges that Congress
enact the findings of the National Commission of New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works and convene a new Commission to review
the adequacy of copyright protection for computer programs.
II. A SIMPLE OUTLINE OF COMPUTER OPERATION
Even the most casual observer recognizes the essential role com-
puters play in today's society: from transportation-controlling the en-
gines of today's automobiles-to leisure activities such as home
electronics. Computers 0 also help perform individual and work-related
tasks by using commercial software programs on personal computers.
This Note focuses on source code programming, the literal requests
that a programmer'1 makes using a program language. 2 Literal elements
are exactly that-the actual commands spelled out, character-by-charac-
ter, line-by-line, for the execution of a problem.13 Copying of the literal
elements of code is easily identified.14 Non-literal elements, however, are
9. Id.
10. A "computer" as used in this Note is the combination of (1) microprocessors that
compute information; (2) the necessary storage media; and (3) the equipment, such as a key-
board and display monitor, necessary to allow use by individuals. W. BUCKSBAUM, PER-
SONAL COMPUTERs HANDBOOK 69-70 (2d ed. 1984). This machinery, without more, is of no
use to individual computer users; software (programs, procedures, rules and documentation) is
needed to respond to individual requests and compute a response. J. ROSENBERG, DICTION-
ARY OF COMPUTERS, DATA PROCESSING, AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 488 (1984).
11. A programmer is an individual that has knowledge of one or more "programming
languages." J. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 407. The programmer takes the user's end-
objective and designs, writes and tests a program in a computer language that the computer
will recognize to perform that task. Id.
12. A program language is the syntax the programmer uses to create instructions the com-
puter will recognize. MCGRAw-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS
1175 (1974). Examples of such languages are Pascal, a language for programmers that em-
phasizes particular aspects of programming referred to as "structured programming," J. Ro-
SENBERG, supra note 10, at 379 and, "BASIC," a mnemonic for Beginner's All-purpose
Symbolic Instruction Code, a program with a simple set of commands primarily designed for
numerical applications, W. BUCKSBAUM, supra note 10, at 41.
13. Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
14. The mere presence of identical code, however, does not automatically indicate that a
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more difficult to define, and copying of them is more difficult for the
courts to identify. The non-literal elements of a program have been col-
lectively termed the "look and feel" or "user interface" of the program.15
A trained programmer can read source code commands and understand
what the machine's non-literal response will be. 6 As the courts have
come to deal with the copyright protection afforded a computer program,
it has become necessary to distinguish the literal from the non-literal ele-
ments of the program. 17
By definition, non-literal elements of a program are those that are
not literally written in the program. Practically, what this means, is that
aspects of a program, which are not apparent to the observer by just
looking at the program code itself, may be protected by copyright even
though they become apparent only when the program operates on a com-
puter. When there is more than one way to reach the same end, and
those ways are hidden from view, problems in copyright protection
arise.18 It is the non-literal elements of programs that have given the
courts the greatest difficulty in defining the extent of copyright protec-
tion. 9 These problems and the courts' inability to solve them are most
apparent in Lotus.
program was infringed. See infra notes 186-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of non-
infringing identical code.
15. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 62-63 (D. Mass. 1990).
16. See Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1243. The processor chip in the computer cannot
read this language, so the source code is converted through a compiling program to object
code, the language from which a machine recognizes each instruction. W. BUCKSBAUM, supra
note 10, at 48.
17. See, eg., Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1248-49 (software copyright protection extends
to object code-symbols recognized by computer-in addition to programmers' source code).
18. A math example may clarify this. Consider the following equations:
Equation #1: 10 - 5 = Y
Equation #2: 30 + 6 = Y
The literal elements of these math problems are quite different: in equation #1, five is sub-
tracted from ten; in equation #2, thirty is divided by six. If these operations were calculated
by a computer program that only displayed the value for Y, both programs would appear
identical to the observer-he or she would only see "5" on the monitor. This display, a non-
literal aspect of "the program," is identical.
In less theoretical language, a screen that flashes a command requesting data entry may be
achieved in some cases using a single program command that causes the computer to flash that
message. A program may also be written to display the request for a half second, then blank
for a half second, display, blank, repeating until requested data has been entered. Again, the
literal code to accomplish this is different, but the non-literal element, displaying a flashing
message, is identical.
19. See, e.g., Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 43-62 (discussing difficulty in defining point of idea-
expression distinction and application to computer software).
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III. THE BACKGROUND OF COMPUTER COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
The protection of an author's original works from duplication by
others is authorized by the United States Constitution, which recognizes
the need to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited Times... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries." 20 By protecting original ideas and expression from du-
plication and use by others, the continued development of innovative
ideas is encouraged.2 Computer program protection is provided to a
limited degree under patent law for the protection of original ideas and
concepts, 22 and to a greater degree by copyright law for original works of
authorship.23 The best security, however, for computer program authors
is copyright protection, because the copyright statute specifically identi-
fies computer programs as protectable.24
Copyright protection subsists in a work from its creation until fifty
years after the author's death.2" This protection, however, is not unbri-
dled; the copyright statute specifically does not grant protection to "any
idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, princi-
ple, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, ex-
plained, illustrated, or embodied in such work."'26 Copyright protection
therefore extends only to the creator's expression in all original works of
authorship, including musical, dramatic, graphic, audiovisual and liter-
ary works.27
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
21. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.").
22. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1988). It is likely that most software does not meet the origi-
nality requirements for patent protection. Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: 4 Com-
prehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRIcS J. 337, 357 (1983).
23. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-914 (1988).
24. See id. §§ 101, 117. Other considerations include greater expense and difficulty pro-
curing patent protection and a longer period of protection under copyright. See Sumner, The
Copyright/Patent Interface: Patent Protection for the Structure of Program Code, 30
JURIMETRICS 107 (1989) (providing thorough discussion of patent versus copyright protection
for computer software).
25. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
26. Id. § 102(b). While section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 is dedicated to the defini-
tion of terms used in the Act, none of the specific exceptions under the Act are defined in that
section. See id. § 101.
27. Id. § 102(a). Additionally, the works must be "fixed in any tangible medium of ex-
pression, now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." Id.
1304 [Vol. 24:1301
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A. Recognition of Difficulties with Computer Copyright Law
The types of authorship included for copyright protection have
gradually expanded as computer technology has grown.28 Congress first
identified programs as "copyrightable" in 1964 when the Register of
Copyrights29 indicated that computer programs would be accepted for
registration.30
Congress revised the copyright laws by enacting the Copyright Act
of 1976 (the 1976 Copyright Act).3 1 During the formulation of the new
laws, Congress created the National Commission on New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU or the Commission).32 Congress
formed the Commission to allow adequate study of the problems raised
by computer uses that had not been dealt with in the Senate or House of
Representatives bills, thereby avoiding further delay of the general copy-
right revisions.33
1. CONTU's final report
The findings of the Commission were not included in the 1976
Copyright Act because the Commission was not ready to publish its final
report (CONTU Report) until July 31, 1978. 31 The CONTUReport rec-
ommended that Congress amend section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act
to add a definition for computer programs,35 and replace the existing sec-
28. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS,
FINAL REPORT 1, 3 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU REPORT].
29. The general administrative functions and duties regarding the Copyright Act are the
responsibility of the Register of Copyrights. 17 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1988). The Register of Copy-
rights is appointed by the Librarian of Congress. Id.
30. CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 15 n.73 (citing REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS,
COPYRIGHT OFFICE CIRCULAR No. 31D (Jan. 1965)).
31. Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1976)).
32. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, §§ 201-208, 88 Stat. 1873, 1873. Congress
explained its function:
(b) The purpose of the Commission is to study and compile data on:
(1) the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship-
(A) in conjunction with automatic systems capable of storing, processing,
retrieving, and transferring information, and...
(2) the creation of new works by the application or intervention of such auto-
matic systems or machine reproduction.
(c) The Commission shall make recommendations as to such changes in copyright
law or procedures that may be necessary to assure for such purposes access to
copyrighted works, and to provide recognition of the rights of copyright owners.
Id. § 201, 88 Stat. at 1873-74.
33. CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 3.
34. IM. at 1.
35. The report suggested that "section 101 be amended to add the following definition: A
'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a
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tion 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act with a new provision to allow specific
copying for archival and utilization purposes peculiar to computer opera-
tion.36 When it again revised the copyright laws, in the Copyright Act
of 1980 (the 1980 Copyright Act), 7 Congress specifically afforded pro-
tection to computer programs by adopting the aforementioned recom-
mendations from the Commission's report.38  The CONTU Report also
recommended that: "Any legislation enacted as a result of these recom-
mendations should be subject to a periodic review to determine its ade-
quacy in the light of continuing technological change. This review
should especially consider the impact of such legislation on competition
and consumer prices in the computer and information industries .... -1
No review has been conducted to date.
2. Limitations placed on protection: The idea/expression dichotomy
and utilitarian objects
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the United States
Supreme Court, in Baker v. Selden,4° recognized that copyright protec-
tion is limited to the author's expression only and does not cover the
author's ideas.41 This restriction has since been incorporated into the
computer in order to bring about a certain result." CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 12.
This suggestion was accepted without change by Congress. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
36. CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 12. Section 117 reads in part:
[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program
provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in the utiliza-
tion of the computer program in conjunction with a machine and that it is used
in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and that all archi-
val copies are destroyed in the event that continued possession of the computer
program should cease to be rightful.
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
The CONTU Report used the term "rightful possessor of a copy," which Congress, in its
only change, replaced with "owner." Compare CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 12 ("[I]t is
not an infringement for the rightful possessor of a copy of a computer program to make or
authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program.. . ." (empha-
sis added)) with 17 U.S.C. § 117 ("[lit is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a
computer program to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program ... ." (emphasis added)).
37. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1980)).
38. H.R. REP. No. 1307, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 23-24, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6460, 6482-83.
39. CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 2.
40. 101 U.S. 99 (1880).
41. Id. at 105 (seminal case holding blank forms reproduced in author's book on account-
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copyright statute.42 However, deciding at what point an idea stops and
its expression begins is quite difficult,4 3 and having codified the restric-
tion has not made the task any easier for the courts.
4
The problems courts face in distinguishing ideas from creative ex-
pression were explained by Judge Learned Hand in Nichols v. Universal
Pictures Corp. 45 In what has become the standard for defining the sepa-
ration of the two concepts, Judge Hand described a theatrical play as
follows:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more
and more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no
more than the most general statement of what the play is about,
and at times might consist only of its title; but there is a point
in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected,
since otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his [or
her] "ideas," to which, apart from their expression, his [or her]
property is never extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix
that boundary, and nobody ever can.'
This concept of abstraction, without any guideline explaining where on
the spectrum the distinction lies, has been adopted by many courts, in-
eluding the court in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
International.47
Courts have also grappled with the utilitarian aspects of computer
programs.48 Section 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act includes the defini-
tion of a "useful article" as "having an intrinsic utilitarian function that
ing did not carry copyright protection on idea of double entry accounting). In discussing the
difference between the author's text and the reproduced forms accompanying it, the Court
stated that "[t]he object of the [author's text] is explanation; the object of the [forms] is use.
The former may be secured by copyright. The latter can only be secured, if it can be secured at
all, by letters patent." Id. at 105; accord Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217-18, reh'g denied,
347 U.S. 949 (1954).
42. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); supra note 26 and accompanying text.
43. See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616-
17 (7th Cir.) ("[T]hat a work is copyrighted says very little about the scope of its protection."),
cerL denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
44. See Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983)
("Many of the courts which have sought to draw the line between an idea and expression have
found difficulty in articulating where it falls."), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
45. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
46. Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
47. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990). "[T]he legal test for deciding copyrightability...
has not been precisely defined either in the copyright statute or in precedents interpreting and
applying it." Id. at 59.
48. See, eg., Apple Computer, 714 F.2d 1240; Apple Computer v. Formula Int'l, 562 F.
Supp. 775 (C.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); Data Cash Sys. v. JS & A
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is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey infor-
mation. An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered
a 'useful article.' "I4 Useful articles are not considered protectable ex-
pression under copyright analysis.50 While a computer program could be
considered a non-protectable useful article by this statutory definition,
the term "computer program" is also defined in the statute.51 Section
117 of the 1980 Copyright Act indicates that computer programs are
protected under copyright law.5 2 The statutory inclusion of protection
for computer programs, combined with the express exclusion of utilita-
rian objects, which programs can be, complicates the courts' analyses of
how far copyright protection extends.5 3 The difficulties courts face in
dealing with the utilitarian aspect of computer programs has contributed
to the inconsistencies in prior decisions, thereby laying the foundation for
the ill-defined policy established in Lotus.
B. The Developing Case Law
The Commission recognized the difficulty in separating expression
from other non-copyrightable elements of computer programs such as
the process being performed by the program.5 4 The CONTU Report
stated that the line between copyrightable form and uncopyrightable pro-
cess "should be drawn on a case-by-case basis by the institution designed
to make fine distinctions-the federal judiciary."5 5
Little guidance is available to the courts to assist them in determin-
Group, 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir.
1980).
49. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (emphasis added).
50. Brandir Int'l v. Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1987).
51. "A 'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101.
52. Section 117 states that copies made for archival purposes or those necessitated in the
utilization of the program are not infringements. Id. § 117.
53. See, eg., Whelan Assoes. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 n.28 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("This test [to separate expression from utilitarian idea] is necessarily difficult to
state, and it may be difficult to understand in the abstract."), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031
(1987).
54. "It is difficult, either as a matter of legal interpretation or technological determination,
to draw the line between the copyrightable element of style and expression in a computer
program and the process which underlies it." CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 22. The
report continued: "[N]ew applications which advancing technology will supply may make
drawing the line of demarcation more and more difficult." Id.
55. Id. at 22-23. The Commission's findings were probably supported by prior case deci-
sions on this problem. See, eg., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir.
1930), cert denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931). The Nichols court stated that "[w]hile we are as
aware as any one that the line, wherever it is drawn, will seem arbitrary, that is no excuse for
not drawing it; it is a question such as courts must answer in nearly all cases." Id. at 122.
1308 [Vol. 24:1301
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ing when a program is a copyrightable expression and when it is a non-
protectable idea, procedure or process." The meager congressional rec-
ord available only reiterates, in even more general terms, the limits stated
by CONTU. 7 Finding sparse legislative history for an essentially "bare-
bones" statute, some courts considering copyright protection for com-
plex computer programs have relied upon the CONTU Report to infer
legislative intent.5 8 Understandably, judicial review has meandered
through intricate computer programs searching for factual elements with
which a copyright infringement analysis can be fashioned.
In its report, the Commission found that "[fllow charts, source
codes, and object codes are works of authorship in which copyright sub-
sists." 9 Holding that a program is a literary work, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit, in Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp. ,'
found that copying of the literal elements of a program, even if only to
allow compatibility with other vendors' programs, was an infringe-
ment.61 This holding was subsequently extended to include the non-lit-
eral elements of a program.62
The line between expression and non-protectable process that
CONTU had discussed appears to have been drawn by a Fifth Circuit
district court in Synercom Technology v. University Computing.63 In
Synercom, the order and sequence of data input formats were held to be
56. See Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 615 (7th
Cir.) ("IT]here is no litmus paper test by which to apply the idea-expression distinction; the
[court's] determination is necessarily subjective."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
57. "[Section 102(b) indicates] that the expression adopted by the programmer is the copy-
rightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods embodied
in the program are not within the scope of the copyright law." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 57, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5670.
58. See, eg., Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984); Atari,
Inc. v. JS & A Group, 597 F. Supp. 5 (N.D. IMI. 1983). But see Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222, 1241-42 (3d Cir. 1986) (court held CONTUReport "cannot
be a substitute for legislative history.... with respect to provisions not amended [to the 1976
Copyright Act] in response to the Report"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
59. CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 21. Flow charts are block diagrams showing the
programmer the outline of the problem that the program must solve. Id. n.109. Source code
is the program in a language which a programmer can observe and understand, directing the
machine to execute the steps necessary for the commands identified in the flow chart. J. Ro-
SENBERG, supra note 10, at 490. Object code is the machine language which instructs the
processor to perform particular functions created from the source code. Id. at 355.
60. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
61. Id. at 1253.
62. See SAS Inst. v. S & H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 826 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)
(defendant "slavish[ly]" copied literal, non-literal and organizational elements of plaintiff's
program into another language to run on different computer).
63. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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non-protectable ideas, not expression. 6 This apparent dividing line,
however, was soon erased by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
in Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory.6" In Whelan, a pro-
gram written in a different computer language than the program for
which the plaintiff sought protection, and with substantial differences in
its literal code, was found similar to the plaintiff's program for copyright
purposes.66 The Whelan court held that copyright protection goes be-
yond literal elements of the program to the structure, sequence and or-
ganization of the program itself.67 This holding has been adopted in
several circuits.68
In January 1987, Lotus Development Corporation (Lotus) brought
a suit against Paperback Software International (Paperback) and Ste-
phenson Software, Limited for infringing the copyright on the user inter-
face69 of its "Lotus 1-2-3" (1-2-3) electronic spreadsheet program.
64. Id. at 1013. The court analogized the problem to the "Figure-H" shift pattern of a
manual automobile transmission:
The [shift] pattern (analogous to the computer "format") may be expressed in several
different ways: by a prose description in a driver's manual, through a diagram, pho-
tograph, or driver training ifim, or otherwise. Each of these expressions may pre-
sumably be protected through copyright. But the copyright protects copying of the
particular expressions of the pattern, and does not prohibit another manufacturer
from marketing a car using the same [shift] pattern.
Id.
65. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
66. Id. at 1229.
67. Id. at 1239.
68. See, ag., Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp.
449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (Eleventh Circuit); Dynamic Solutions, Inc. v. Planning & Control, Inc.,
1987 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,062 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 1987) (Second Circuit);
Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (Ninth Circuit);
E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485 (D. Minn. 1985) (Eighth Circuit). But
see Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.) (expressly
rejecting Whelan where sequence and organization may be dictated by marketplace), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
69. The Lotus court described the term "user interface" of 1-2-3 as including such ele-
ments as the menus (including their structure and organization), the "long prompts" that ap-
pear at the bottom of the menu further describing each menu choice, the screens on which they
appear, the function key assignments, and the macro commands and macro language. Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 63 (D. Mass. 1990). The term "look




IV. THE LOTUS COURT'S APPROACH TO THE BREADTH OF
COMPUTER SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT
A. Facts of Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software
International
The concept of an electronic spreadsheet 7° was first put into com-
mercial practice in a computer program called VisiCalc.7" While Visi-
Cale proved to be a commercial success, its marketability as a
spreadsheet was limited because it was written to operate only on the
Apple II personal computer.72 With the introduction of the IBM per-
sonal computer, the Apple system's limitations became more apparent.73
"Building on [VisiCalc's] revolutionary idea for an electronic spread-
sheet,"'74 the original authors of Lotus 1-2-3 took advantage of the IBM
personal computer enhancements and created "an evolutionary product
that was built upon the shoulders of VisiCalc."75  The 1-2-3 program
went on to become a great success; it is the leading spreadsheet program
sold today.76
Dr. James Stephenson, the founder of one of the co-defendants, Ste-
phenson Software, also recognized the limitations of VisiCalc.7 7 Ste-
phenson began development of his own electronic spreadsheet, eventually
released as VP-Planner.78 During the initial development stages, the
menus used in this program were different from those used in both Visi-
Cale and 1-2-3. 71 One month before installing the initial version of VP-
Planner, however, Stephenson observed the 1-2-3 program and continued
to improve upon his own program for the next year and a half'8 °
By the autumn of 1984, the success of 1-2-3 was apparent. Stephen-
70. A spreadsheet "is an electronic replacement for the traditional financial modeling
tools: the accountant's columnar pad, pencil, and calculator." D. COBB & G. LEBLOND,
USING 1-2-3, at 17 (2d ed. 1986).
71. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
Electronic spreadsheets have found tremendous use not just in the financial community, but in
all areas where many computations have to be made, as they produce nearly instantaneous
results. D. COBB & G. LEBLOND, supra note 70, at 9-12.
72. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65.
73. Id. The Apple computer had limited memory, limited screen display and a limited
number of keys on the keyboard (eg., no function keys and no up and down cursor arrows).
When VisiCalc was rewritten for the IBM personal computer (IBM PC), it did not take advan-
tage of these additional features of the IBM PC. Id.
74. Id. at 66.
75. Id. The original authors of Lotus 1-2-3 were Mitchell Kapor and Jonathan Sachs. Id.
76. Huber, Madonna Ain't Software, FoRBEs, Sept. 3, 1990, at 104.
77. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68.
78. IL
79. Id.
80. Id. at 68-69.
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son decided that the success of VP-Planner depended on its compatibility
with 1-2-3.81 Later, in his affidavit to the district court, Stephenson
stated: "'The only way to accomplish this result... was to ensure that
the arrangement and names of commands and menus in VP-Planner con-
formed to that of Lotus 1-2-3.' "12 This would allow the transfer between
spreadsheets without the loss of macros8 3 or without requiring the re-
training of their operators.8 4
The defendants then converted VP-Planner into a program more
like 1-2-3, that was publicly advertised as a "workalike" for 1-2-3.85 In
fact, the operating manual for the program stated, "VP-Planner is
designed to work like Lotus 1-2-3, keystroke for keystroke .... VP-
Planner's worksheet is a feature-for-feature workalike for 1-2-3. It does
macros. It has the same command tree. It allows the same kind of cal-
culations, the same kind of numerical information. Everything 1-2-3
does, VP-Planner does."
86
The Lotus court did, however, find some differences between VP-
Planner and 1-2-3. For instance, the VP-Planner menu line begins with a
different command than 1-2-3, and some menus include additional com-
mands not found in 1-2-3.17 Additionally, the start-up screens, location
on the screen of menu lines, exact wording of the screen prompts, organi-
zation of "help" screens, width of the displayed screen and security of
portions of the spreadsheet differ between the two programs.8 8 Neverthe-
less, the court found the works "substantially, indeed, strikingly,
similar." 9
The court noted that Excel, another electronic spreadsheet program
that is not exactly compatible with 1-2-3, has also been a commercial
success.90 Although Excel's main screen display more closely resembles
a paper spreadsheet than does that in 1-2-3, the court found there to be
"a rather low limit, as a factual matter," to the number of ways to make
a computer screen resemble a spreadsheet.9" The court extended this ar-
81. Id. at 69.
82. Id. (quoting Stephenson Affidavit) (emphasis added by court).
83. Macros are small programs within the spreadsheet usually created by the operator to
execute a series of common computations or functions, for example, taking values from various
locations in the spreadsheet and computing their sum. Id. at 72.
84. Id. at 69.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 69-70.
87. Id. at 70.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 69.
91. Id. at 66.
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gument to find that the identification of "cells" 92 by means of a "rotated
'L'" configuration was therefore non-protectable idea, not expression."
All parties in the Lotus dispute agreed, as a general proposition, that
literal elements of a computer program, including both the source code
and object code, if original, are copyrightable. 94 Lotus contended, how-
ever, that copyright protection extends to all elements of a program that
consist of original expression, whether literal or non-literal, including ex-
pression embodied in a program's "user interface.""
B. The Lotus Court's Legal Analysis-A New Test
The Lotus court applied a new three-step test to determine whether
it should afford copyright protection to the user interface. 96 Although
the Lotus court discussed the background of facts and law in the com-
puter program copyright area for eighteen pages,97 it concluded that "the
legal test for deciding copyrightability, in a factual context such as is
presented here, has not been precisely defined either in the copyright stat-
ute or in precedents interpreting and applying it."9' What exactly the
court found so unique in the facts before it, however, is not clear.99 The
92. A cell is the intersection of a column and row on the screen in which a numerical
value, formula or text may be entered. Id. at 63.
93. Id. at 66. The court explained that the individual cells, the regions in which numbers
or math formulas are entered, are generally identified by a "rotated 'L' " configuration (an "L"
rotated 90 degrees clockwise). Id. at 63. Columns are identified across the top using the
alphabet and rows down the left side using numbers. Id. Therefore, cell Al would be the cell
or box in the topmost left hand corner. In addition, a range of three cells down the left side
would be the range from Al to A3, and the range of three cells across the top would be the
range from Al to Cl.
94. Id. at 45.
95. Id. at 45-46. See supra note 69 for a definition of the "user interface." The difference
between the "user interface" and the rest of a program was well stated in Manufacturers Tech-
nologies v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989). The Manufacturers Technologies
court explained: "The computer program and any authorship contained therein is designed to
organize and direct the computer to efficiently perform a particular task when properly di-
rected by the user," whereas "the user interface is designed to communicate with the user in a
way to facilitate the understanding and use of the program itself." Id. at 993.
96. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 59-61 (D. Mass. 1990).
97. Id. at 45-62.
98. Id. at 59.
99. Elements of the user interface had previously been reviewed by the courts for copy-
right protection. See supra notes 62-68. The Lotus court first discussed Synercom Technology
v. University Computing, 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978). Synercom's holding conflicted
with the Lotus court's protection of the user interface. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 54-56. The
Lotus court, with little support for its finding, dismissed Synercom, stating:
Synercom, though, was published less than a month after the publication of the
CONTU report (which it never cites) and well before the 1980 amendments. Since
then, congressional and judicial development of the law of copyrightability of com-
puter programs has advanced considerably, and Synercom's central proposition-
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court merely stated that to gain copyright protection, a software devel-
oper must satisfy the court in each of the following three steps:
FIRST, [the decision maker must] choose some formulation-
some conception or definition of the "idea"-for the purpose of
distinguishing between the idea and its expression.... SEC-
OND, the decision maker must focus upon whether an alleged
expression of the idea is limited to elements essential to expres-
sion of that idea (or is one of only a few ways of expressing the
idea) or instead includes identifiable elements of expression not
essential to every expression of that idea.... THIRD, having
identified elements of expression not essential to every expres-
sion of the idea, the decision maker must focus on whether
those elements are a substantial part of the allegedly copyright-
able "work.'' 1
The court suggested that its test was built on a solid foundation by
asserting it to be within the guidelines of the many "'markers' of the
borderline between copyrightability and non-copyrightability." 1°O Nev-
ertheless, the court then directly contradicted long-followed case law
when it declared that "idea" does not have to be separable from "expres-
sion" to afford copyright protection to the work.102 Having watered
down one of the few explicit findings in copyright idea/expression analy-
that the expression of non-literal sequence and order is inseparable from the idea and
accordingly is not copyrightable-has been explicitly rejected by several courts.
Id. at 55 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In fact, there is essentially no congressional
development, see supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text, and the Lotus court's premise for
this analysis is the lack of prior judicial definition, Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 59. The reasoning
for diminishing Synercom's holding for not referencing the CONTU Report is neither apparent
nor explained. Following a lengthy discussion of holdings both for and against the protection
of the user interface, the Lotus court made a conclusory dismissal of Synercom's holding. See
id. at 55 ("In any event, Synercom's input formats are quite different from, and distinguishable
from, the non-literal aspects of 1-2-3 at issue in this case.").
100. Id. at 60-61. The court recognized that the decision maker measures substantiality in
this part of the test in both a qualitative and quantitative manner. Id. (citing SAS Inst. v. S &
H Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 829-30 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)).
101. Id. at 59.
102. Id at 60. Although the court stated that "[o]ne need not totally disentangle the idea
from its expression in order to conclude that a particular aspect is expression," id., it has long
been held that expression that is not separable from the idea may not be afforded copyright
protection. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971)
(idea of jeweled bee pin inseparable from expression; protecting expression in such circum-
stances grants monopoly on idea to copyright owner); see also Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99,
103 (1879) (methods and diagrams necessary incidents to expression are not protectable); Mor-
rissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) (where number of ways
to express are limited, no particular form of expression comes from the subject matter and
copyright may not be granted). The Lotus court cited Herbert Rosenthal for this very premise.
Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 59.
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ses, the court immediately backed down from its rigorous legal test in the
first part of its three-step analysis. The Lotus court held that the decision
maker must focus upon "alternatives that counsel may suggest, or the
court may conceive,"103 and the decision maker should then choose some
formulation along the scale of abstraction discussed by Judge Hand in
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 104 This fundamental step in deciding
a copyright infringement case-identification of the idea from which pro-
tectable expression is derived-and the first step in the Lotus court's
legal test, was never clearly made. Inferentially, however, the court iden-
tiffied the "electronic spreadsheet" as the idea from which the expression
derived.105
103. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 60 (emphasis added).
104. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931); see supra note 46 and
accompanying text.
105. See Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65-66. The Lotus court seemed to start its analysis by
identifying the most fundamental level of abstraction under Judge Hand's test. See id, at 65.
The court discussed the non-protectable idea of an electronic spreadsheet. Id. Although not
clear, the court apparently adopted this level of abstraction for the remainder of its analysis.
The court stated:
At the most general level of Hand's abstractions scale the computer programs at issue
in this case, and other computer programs that have been considered during the
course of trial, are expressions of the idea of a computer program for an electronic
spreadsheet.... Thus, even though programs like VisiCalc, 1-2-3, Multiplan, Super-
Calc4, and Excel are very different in their structure, appearance, and method of
operation, each is, at the most basic level, just a different way of expressing the same
idea: the electronic spreadsheet.
Id. at 65 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court further stated:
Of course, if a particular expression of the idea of an electronic spreadsheet communi-
cates no details beyond those essential to stating the idea itself, then that expression
would not be copyrightable. The issue here is whether Lotus 1-2-3 does go beyond
those details essential to any expression of the idea, and includes substantial elements
of expression, distinctive and original, which are thus copyrightable.
Id. (emphasis added). With no further delineation of the "idea" being expressed other than
this most general abstraction, the court began its analysis of the expressive elements, having
apparently adopted this general abstraction as the conceptual "idea" under the first step of the
legal test. The court continued:
Accordingly, [the rotated "L" screen display] of electronic spreadsheet computer pro-
grams, if not present in every expression of such a program, is present in most expres-
sions. . . .Another expressive element that merges with the idea of an electronic
spreadsheet-that is, that is an essential detail present in most if not all expressions of
an electronic spreadsheet-is the designation of a particular key that, when pressed,
will invoke the menu command system.
Id. at 66 (emphasis added). The court at this point discussed the menu command system as
"expression" of an electronic spreadsheet; however, the court had previously considered the
menu command system to be "idea" and not "expression." The court observed:
The idea for a two-line moving cursor menu is also functional and obvious, and,
indeed, is used in a wide variety of computer programs including spreadsheet pro-
grams. Nevertheless, it does not follow that every possible method of designing a
menu system that includes a two-line moving cursor is non-copyrightable.
Id. at 65 (emphasis added). The court's repeated reference to the idea of an electronic spread-
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1. The court's flawed abstraction of protectable expression
The defendants in Lotus asserted that only literal manifestations of
computer programs are copyrightable.106 Lotus, on the other hand, as-
serted that copyright protection extends to all elements of a computer
program containing original expression, whether literal or non-literal, in-
cluding the expression found in a program's "look and feel" or user inter-
face." 7 The Lotus court selectively reviewed the CONTUReport and the
sparse congressional record, ultimately concluding that "Congress mani-
fested an intention to use the idea-expression distinction as part of the
test of copyrightability for computer programs."10 8 The court expressly
rejected the defendants' literal versus non-literal test."°
The literal versus non-literal distinction was not an issue de novo for
copyright analysis. In Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory,110
the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that copyright protection
goes beyond the literal elements of a program to the program's structure,
sequence and organization. 1 In Whelan, a programmer brought a
copyright infringement action against a dental laboratory for which a
custom program had been developed. '2 Jaslow Dental Laboratory's
program allowed operation on a different computer system.' 1 3 This cus-
tom program was essentially identical to the plaintiff's custom program,
but was written in another computer language.1 4 The Whelan court
found that while the literal code was substantially different, there was
overall similarity between the two programs, and therefore infringement
had occurred.
15
Finding support in Whelan-although previously stating this was a
new issue for copyright 16-- the Lotus court quickly dispensed with hold-
ings that disagreed with Whelan. Without reviewing the merits of the
holding, the court reasoned that refusing to invoke copyright protection
sheet, however, imputes this to be the formulation, conception or definition of "idea" that was
made under the first step of its legal test.
106. Id. at 45.
107. Id. at 45-46.
108. Id. at 54.
109. Id.
110. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
111. Id at 1248.
112. Id. at 1225.
113. Id at 1226.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1248; see also Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., 886 F.2d 1173
(9th Cir. 1989) (non-literal aspects of program that are copyrightable are those that embody
expression rather than idea).
116. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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for the non-literal elements of sequence and ordering of data, as the court
did in Synercom Technology v. University Computing,117 would, as a
practical matter, result in computer programs not getting the substantial
protection the Lotus court found Congress to have mandated."' Fur-
thermore, the Lotus court cited, but did not discuss, the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Plains Cotton Cooperative v. Goodpasture Computer Service.1 9
The Plains Cotton court, rejecting the Whelan decision, held that where
the market dictates a standard format for a computer program, that for-
mat is not copyrightable expression.1 20 The Lotus court later dismissed
the defendants' claims of a market basis for the restriction of copyright
on the program.
121
The Lotus court stated that expression merges with the idea of an
electronic spreadsheet where an essential detail is present in most, if not
all, expressions of an electronic spreadsheet.1 22 Under this analysis, nec-
essary expression will not be extended protection. For example, the
court discussed the use of the slash key ("/") to invoke the menu com-
mand system. 123 Eliminating all the letter, number and arithmetic keys
as choices, 24 the court found the slash key to be "one of very few practi-
cal options."1 25 Because the choice of available keys is so limited, the
Lotus court found this expression to have merged with the idea of having
a readily available method of invoking the menu command system. As a
result, the use of the slash key to invoke the menu command system was
held not protectable
1 26
Still, the Lotus court concluded that the menu command structure
itself, as an element of the program capable of being expressed in an al-
117. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
118. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 56.
119. Id. at 55 (citing Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987)).
120. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262.
121. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 75-79. See infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
122. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
123. Id. The court also identified the math function keys (+,-, X,/) as expression essen-
tial to spreadsheets. Id.
124. These keys are required for the use of an "electronic spreadsheet" and cannot also be
used to invoke the menu systems. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The court named only the semicolon and slash keys as practical alternatives. Id.
The court's argument that a user should not have to press two keys at the same time, such as
the "Alt," "Shift" or "Ctrl" keys, is weakened by the plethora of programs that utilized such a
system at the time of the court's decision. See, e.g., WORDPERFECT CORP., WORDPERFEcr 4
(Version 5.1 1989); MICRORIM, INC., R:BASE UsER's MANUAL ix (Version 3.0 1990); ME-
RIDIAN TECHNOLOGY, INC., CARBON COPY PLUS 3-18 (1988).
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most unlimited number of ways, was eligible for protection. 127 The court
found the use of the terms "Worksheet," "Range," "Copy," "Move,"
"File," "Graph," "Data" and "Quit" to be non-obvious, and a unique
way of expressing a command structure.1 28 Apparently, to the court,
simply spelling out and explaining command terms similar to the com-
mands used in the VisiCalc program is not obvious.1 29 Nevertheless, it is
difficult to envision a term other than 1-2-3's "graph" to identify as
clearly a command to display a graph.1 3  The court, however, did not
clarify where along the continuum of expression-abstraction the 1-2-3
menu system became protectable expression.
Compounding the confusion, the Lotus court found that Paperback
had copied the macro command language of 1-2-3.131 This determina-
tion was made in spite of the following findings of the court:
(1) The macro language requires the recognition of "cells."
The court recognized that there were limited numbers of
ways of recognizing cells, and that the system used in 1-2-
3, a rotated "L," was not copyrightable expression.132
(2) Where the number of keys available for an action is lim-
ited, it merges expression to the idea and is not protect-
able.1 33 Menu choices, using a unique character for each
word, are limited by their nature to the number of choices.
As such, this would not be protectable expression.134
(3) Mathematical operators, such as the addition, subtrac-
tion, multiplication and division symbols are not
copyrightable.
135
(4) The natural laws of mathematics, which are not copy-
127. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68. The court at this point had switched to identifying the
"idea" to be expressed as a menu command structure. See supra note 105 and accompanying
text.
128. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 68.
129. VisiCalc used a menu system that identified choices only by the first letter of the term.
Id. at 67. In one instance, the term was identical-VisiCalc displayed "M" for "move" and 1-
2-3 displayed "Move" for "move." See id. at 67.
130. Other terms could be available, for example, "show," but word limits are essentially
the same as the limits placed on the particular key invoking the menu system-a limitation the
Lotus court found too restrictive to be afforded copyright protection. See supra note 126.
131. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 78.
132. Id. at 66. See supra note 92 for an explanation of the "rotated 'L'" system.
133. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
134. Id. (court found keys to invoke menu system limited to few practical choices and not
copyrightable). Although the court held differently, there is suggestion in the holding that
terms in a menu may not be copyrightable, as they are obvious or merge with the idea of the
particular command. Id. at 67.
135. Id. at 66.
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rightable, force certain orders of implementing cells, oper-
ators and choices described above.
The court then found that the macro language of 1-2-3,136 utilizing this
analysis, was copyrightable. 137  Yet, there is nothing in the copyright
statutes or in subsequent court holdings that finds copyrightable expres-
sion resulting from a forced arrangement of non-copyrightable
elements. 1318
2. Erroneous protection of the user interface resulting from the
flawed analysis
The Lotus court adopted the proposition that the "look and feel," or
user interface, includes: (1) the menu structure and organization, (2) the
long prompts, 139 (3) the screen on which they appear, (4) function key
assignments, and (5) the macro commands and language."4 As a result,
the Lotus court granted protection to each such component of the user
interface. In each case, however, the court was wrong. First, menu
structure and organization should not be afforded blanket copyright pro-
tection since it may contain only non-protected ideas and necessary ex-
pression.14 Second, long prompts-menu descriptions-and the screens
on which they appear are necessary functions of the menus; they are
ideas used throughout the computer programming industry 42 and, as
such, should not be subject to copyright protection.143 The macro com-
mands and language similarly should not be protected by copyright be-
cause they are fixed orders of non-copyrightable elements."4
Finally, function key assignments should not be protected. As-
136. "In 1-2-3, the command terms within a macro may consist of menu choices (e.g., "IC"
to copy a cell ... )[,] keyboard commands (such as function keys, cursor keys, or the 'enter'
key), and special macro commands ... ." Id. at 64-65. While the special macro commands
might contain terms of unique expression, the court did not distinguish this, instead focussing
on a discussion of macros utilizing menu choices discussed in the text. See id. at 65.
137. Id. at 68.
138. CONTU recognized this limitation and discussed the probable application of parallel
cases using historical facts, where the use of necessary facts is a "fair use" of copyrighted
material and not an infringement. CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 23 (Commission cited,
e.g., Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 385
U.S. 1009 (1967)).
The United States Supreme Court recently stated: "Common sense tells us that 100 un-
copyrightable facts do not magically change their status when gathered together in one place."
Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 59 U.S.L.W. 4251, 4252 (Mar. 27, 1991).
139. See supra note 69 for an explanation of "long prompts."
140. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 63.
141. See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
142. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 65.
143. See infra notes 186-92 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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signing actions to function keys within a program is severely restricted
because most personal computers are limited to either ten or twelve
choices for function key assignments.145 The Lotus court recognized that
copyright protection is unavailable when there is a limited choice of al-
ternatives.'" Had the Lotus court analyzed separately whether or not
each component of the user interface was protectable, it would have con-
cluded, based on the reported facts and the analyses it recognized in its
opinion, that no copyright protection was available.' 47
3. The court's dispensation of marketplace disruption claims
Finally, the Lotus court ignored Paperback's claim of a need to
achieve compatibility and standardization. 4 ' Paperback argued that
granting copyright protection to a user interface will frustrate the public
interest in allowing programmers to achieve innovation by "borrowing"
and improving upon ideas of other programmers.1 49 The court dis-
counted this argument in part by citing other programs that were suc-
cessful despite a different user interface.' 50 Additionally, the court found
no support for this proposition in the legislative history of the copyright
statutes.'5 ' The court stated that "the statute does not bar copyright-
145. WORDPERFECT CORP., supra note 126, at 332.
146. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 66.
147. This is based on the concept-idea-processes of 1-2-3 identified by the Lotus court. See
id. at 49. Certainly, elements with these processes may be protectable expression such as the
wording placed in a submenu explaining a choice or even organization of menu commands not
based on alphabetical order or frequency of use.
148. See id. at 77.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 78. The court cited the success of Excel, "an innovative spreadsheet program
that is not compatible with 1-2-3, either in its menu structure or in its macro command facil-
ity." Id. Unfortunately, the court neglected to mention the fact that Excel gained its success
on a completely different operating system, Apple Macintosh computers, and was not a com-
petitor with 1-2-3 until recently. See E. JONES, USING EXCEL FOR THE PC 16 (1988). While
other electronic spreadsheet programs have survived in the market, their success pales when
compared to 1-2-3's market share. M. CAMPBELL, 1-2-3 POWER USER'S GUIDE 130 (1988).
Even Excel, the leading spreadsheet on the Macintosh system, E. JONES, supra, at 16, included
capabilities to read and write 1-2-3 files in its IBM version "[bjecause of 1-2-3's wide base of
support in corporate America," M. CAMPBELL, supra, at 130.
In a similar disregard for the realities of software operation and the software marketplace,
the court stated that Paperback could have incorporated a macro conversion capability "as the
creators of Excel have successftlly done." Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 69. Excel does contain a
conversion program, however, its usefulness can best be described as marginal. See, e.g., C.
TOWNSEND, MASTERING EXCEL ON THE IBM PC 509 (1988) (window properties, 1-2-3
charts to Excel graphs and macros do not convert to Excel); E. JONES, supra, at 491 ("Due to
many differences between Lotus 1-2-3 and Excel, some macros cannot be successfully
translated.").
151. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 77-79.
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ability merely because the originality of the expression becomes associ-
ated, in the marketplace, with usefulness of the work to a degree and in
dimensions not previously achieved by other products on the market."'
152
This absolute finding is not supported by either case law or the legis-
lative background of computer copyright. In Plains Cotton, the Fifth
Circuit held that sequence and organization of program menus may con-
stitute unprotectable "ideas" where market factors play a significant role
in their determination.' 53 Furthermore, in the CONTU Report, the
Committee was cognizant of the potential interference within the com-
puter industry that copyright protection could precipitate. 154 The testi-
mony forming the foundation of the CONTU Report was heard between
1975 and 1978 when the computer industry was very different than it is
today.'5 5 Yet, even at that point in time, the Committee noted:
One of the hallmarks of a competitive industry is the ease with
which entrepreneurs may enter into competition with firms al-
ready doing business. The absence of significant barriers to en-
tering the program-writing market is striking. There are
several hundred independent firms whose stock in trade is com-
puter programs. New software firms may be formed with few
people and little money; entry into the market has thus far been
fairly easy. None of the evidence received by the Commission
suggests that affording copyright to programs would in any
way permit program authors to monopolize the market for
their products. Nor is there any indication that any firm is even
remotely close to dominating the programming industry.
5 6
The Commission made clear in the CONTU Report that it was concerned
with the potential burden of copyright on computer programs, devoting
an entire section to a discussion of the economic effects of program copy-
right.157 The Commission concluded from prior copyright cases that:
"A copyright owner may monopolize his [or her] expression but not the
market in which it is purveyed."' 58 Additionally, in its initial recommen-
dations, the Commission stated the objectives of computer copyright
protection:
To provide reasonable protection for proprietors without un-
duly burdening users of programs and the general public, the
152. Id. at 58.
153. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1262.
154. CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 12.
155. Id. at 1.
156. Id. at 23 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
157. Id. at 23-25.
158. Id. at 24.
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following statements concerning program copyright ought to be
true:
1. Copyright should proscribe the unauthorized copying of
these works.
2. Copyright should in no way inhibit the rightful use of these
works.
3. Copyright should not block the development and dissemi-
nation of these works.
4. Copyright should not grant anyone more economic power
than is necessary to achieve the incentive to create. 159
It seems clear that the Lotus court overlooked the very real concerns of
the Commission on the breadth of copyright protection to be
implemented.
V. A MORE REASONABLE ANALYSIS OF SOFTWARE COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION UNDER EXISTING AUTHORITY
Blanket protection of the non-literal elements of computer programs
does not serve the purpose of copyright law-to encourage the develop-
ment of original expression." Programmers should be encouraged to
write programs that will operate faster, use less memory or otherwise be
more efficient than existing programs. A review of prior holdings dem-
onstrates that the facts of the Lotus case are not unique. A new legal test
was not required. A careful review of case precedent suggests that: (1)
programs are comprised of expression for many "ideas"; (2) elements of
programs, both literal and non-literal, may be "stock and trade" for pro-
grammers and should not warrant copyright protection; (3) screen dis-
plays should be protected if they convey information or expression not
necessary to the idea being conveyed; and, (4) factors in the marketplace,
in limited instances, may be considered by the court.
A. Identifying the "Copyright Idea" in a Computer Program
When identifying the "idea" behind a program in order to analyze
the protectable "expression" of that idea, courts should abstain from for-
mulating the idea at the most general level of abstraction as the court did
in Lotus. 6 The most abstract level of idea is overly broad and includes
159. Id. at 12.
160. See Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985); Twentieth
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).




isolated ideas within that abstraction, erroneously granting copyright
protection to ideas.' 62 Part of the policy of copyright protection-that of
the free use of ideas' 63-- assumes that the similarity required for a finding
of infringement varies according to the type of work and the ideas being
expressed.'6 The Lotus court did not recognize this, thereby utilizing a
grossly overbroad analysis.
In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. ,165 Judge Learned Hand's ab-
straction test decreased the detail of two plays being compared until a
point was reached where the two works shared common elements.
66
Judge Hand found no infringement by the defendant's play where the
common matter was only found at the most general, single idea of the
trouble and turmoil of an inter-religious marriage. 67 Even though Judge
Hand found only this single idea common to the works, other ideas were
considered by the court, including the incidents and the characters of the
plays. 161 Judge Hand in Nichols did not indicate that an abstraction
analysis must begin from a single idea, but rather implies that more than
one idea should be considered by the court.
169
If a court finds the idea/expression boundary to be the most general
idea abstraction-the point from which Judge Hand began the inquiry
for the idea/expression boundary-the subsequent analysis will always
grant overbroad copyright protection. Computer programs incorporate
several ideas, many of which are not related to a general concept such as
162. See, e.g., Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.) (allegations of
copying encompassed non-copyrightable material, finding summary judgment against plaintiff
appropriate), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 841 (1980).
163. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 54; see also CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 20 (principle
denying copyright protection to ideas extends to expression of ideas that have limited number
of ways they can be expressed). "This principle [idea expression dichotomy] attempts to rec-
oncile two competing social interests: rewarding an individual's creativity and effort while at
the same time permitting the nation to enjoy the benefits and progress from use of the same
subject matter." Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157,
1163 (9th Cir. 1977).
164. Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 59 U.S.L.W. 4251, 4254 (Mar. 27, 1991)
('This Court has long recognized that the fact/expression dichotomy limits severely the scope
of protection in fact-based works."); see, eg., Diamond v. Am-Law Publishing Corp., 745 F.2d
142, 148 (2d Cir. 1984) (informational work less protected than creative work); Landsberg v.
Scrabble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 488 (9th Cir.) (factual works have
narrower protection), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
165. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
166. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
167. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 122.
168. Id. at 121.
169. See Nimmer, Bemacchi & Frischling, A Structured Approach to Analyzing the Substan-
tial Similarity of Computer Software in Copyright Infringement Cases, 20 ARMZ. ST. L.J. 625,
640 (1988) (abstractions test implicitly recognizes that work may consist of numerous ideas
and expressions).
1323June 1991]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1301
an electronic spreadsheet. 17° As an example, all programs need the abil-
ity to save completed work to a memory storage device.1 71 This need
calls for a choice from a menu selection. 17 2 Using the Lotus court's logic,
if the menu command system is protectable expression, any increase in
detail beyond that point is still protectable expression. 17 3 Where a menu
choice is used merely to save work, the Lotus court would erroneously
find an infringement under its stated logic. 174
A computer program is more similar to a compilation of facts than a
screenplay or novel. Facts themselves are not protected by copyright
laws.17 5 Nevertheless, the expression embodied in the compilation of fac-
tual information is protected,176 as is any additional expression that the
author may provide.1 77 As such, factual works are treated differently
from fictional works 17 -- the scope of protection for factual works is
more limited. 179 The "factual" elements of a computer program, such as
the "Save" command, are the independent ideas found within many, if
not all, programs. Following traditional factual analysis, with narrow
170. See, e.g., Pearl Sys. v. Competition Elecs., 1988 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,338
(S.D. Fla. July 15, 1988) (involving copyright infringement action for competitive pistol-shoot-
ing timing device). The District Court for the Southern District of Florida did not stop its
abstraction at a single idea, but recognized and identified the individual ideas that were
expressed:
At issue here are the two subroutines. The par time entry subroutine was designed to
provide a method for the user to set a par time. That is the idea. The shot review
subroutine was designed to allow the user to review the shots he or she has fired and
to learn of the time that elapsed between each shot. That is also an idea. The sub-
routines themselves are expressions of those ideas.
Id.; accord Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 615-16 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (four of twelve
modules of programs match-title, loading, text scrolling and character generator-but mod-
ules were similar in ideas rather than expression and were found not to infringe).
171. A memory storage device is a device that holds data, and from which the same data
may be retrieved. MCGRAW-HILL DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL TERMS 922
(1974).
172. For example, in Lotus 1-2-3 the "Save" command is the menu choice that places data
in the memory storage device. D. COBB & G. LEBLOND, supra note 70, at 233.
173. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
174. The court did not reach this level, having found infringement at the menu command
level. See supra note 127.
175. Feist Publications, 59 U.S.L.W. at 4252.
176. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
177. Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 556-57 (1985).
178. Landsberg, 736 F.2d at 488 (similarity requirement for infringement varies with type
of work). "[Authors of factual works] often can choose from only a narrow range of expres-
sion.... [S]imilarity of expression may have to amount to verbatim reproduction or very close
paraphrasing before a factual work will be deemed infringed." Id.
179. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 563 ("The law generally recognizes a greater need to
disseminate factual works than works of fiction or fantasy."); Narell v. Freeman, 872 F.2d 907,
914 (9th Cir. 1989) (more similarity allowed in informational work before finding of infringe-
ment than allowed in creative work).
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protection for any expression of a fact, using the term "Save" would not
be afforded any copyright protection.180 Similarly, the term "Graph"' -
which is a "necessary fact" for electronic spreadsheet programs-would
not be protected. The legal test the Lotus court implemented gave pro-
tection to these commands.' 8'
Recognizing that programs express more than just one generalized
idea will avoid the overbroad protection granted by the Lotus court. In
Manufacturers Technologies v. CAMS, Ina ,"2 the court recognized the
pitfalls of overbroad protection.'83 Considering a claim for infringement
of a computer screen display, the court established the legal fiction of two
separate copyright registrations, treating "the single registration of the
computer program as accomplishing two interrelated yet distinct regis-
trations; one of the program itself and one of the screen displays or user
interface of that program, to the extent that each contains copyrightable
subject matter." 1 84 Separate copyright registrations, the court reasoned,
"[avoids] the mistake of identifying a program's idea with the idea of a
particular screen display or some element therein. It recognizes that a
computer program and its screen displays are, for copyright purposes,
fundamentally distinct."'
185
B. Program Routines Should Not Be Given Copyright Protection Just
as Scenes a Faire186 Are Excluded From Protection in Other
Literary Works
Along the lines of protecting programs in a fashion similar to factual
works, courts should remain cognizant of the limitations placed upon
computer programmers by the machinery for which they are writing pro-
grams. Unlike most artistic work that is expressed directly to another
person, computer programs necessarily have a machine processing one
person's expression for another person's perception. 87 This factor in-
180. This is in conformity with the doctrine of merger of ideas and expression as identified
in the CONTU Report: "The 'idea-expression identity' exception provides that copyrighted
language may be copied without infringing when there is but a limited number of ways to
express a given idea." CONTU REPORT, supra note 28, at 20 (emphasis added).
181. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
182. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
183. Id. at 995 (screen format conventions too narrow a range of possibilities to be afforded
copyright protection).
184. Id. at 993.
185. Id.
186. "The French use a very expressive phrase in dramatic literature: 'scenes a faire'; that
is, scenes which 'must' be done." Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 273, 275
(S.D. Cal. 1945).
187. This intervention, and more specifically the fact that a program must be converted to
June 1991] 1325
1326 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:1301
troduces elements of utility and limitations to that expression with which
courts must deal.
Copyright in literary works has long recognized that no protection
will be extended to scenes a faire-those elements that are stock and
trade of a story."' 8 Similarly, computer programs have scenes a faire in
"routines"'8 9 of program code that are standard for accomplishing a cer-
tain task on the computer. 90 There are limitations on the efficient use of
a programming language by a programmer. It is therefore possible for a
programmer to duplicate these routines in programs identically or nearly
identically without intentional copying.' 9' These routines are necessary
expressions of an idea, and as such should not be protected expression.
192
In computer programs, scenes a faire can be protected from direct
copying. Programmers can, and in fact do, imbed identifiers within pro-
gram code. 93 These identifiers-non-functional terms in the program
code-evidence direct copying when found in an infringer's program. In
object code to enable a machine to utilize the program, has led to the observation that perhaps
the object code should not be granted any copyright protection at all. Samuelson, CONTU
Revisited: The Case Against Copyright Protection for Computer Programs in Machine-Readable
Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663, 753.
188. See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir.) (drunks, prostitutes,
vermin and derelict cars are scenes that necessarily result from New York police story and are
unprotectable "scenes a faire"), cert denied, 476 U.S. 1159 (1986). "Under [the doctrine of
scenes afaire], a second author does not infringe even if he [or she] reproduces verbatim the
first author's expression, if that expression constitutes 'stock scenes or scenes that flow...
necessarily from common unprotectable ideas,' because to hold otherwise would give the first
author a monopoly on the commonplace ideas behind the scenes afaire." Landsberg v. Scrab-
ble Crossword Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir.) (quoting See v. Durang, 711
F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984); accord Narell v. Freeman,
872 F.2d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 1989) ("[S]tock scenes containing little in the way of original
expression are not protected.").
189. A routine is "part of a program, or a sequence of instructions called by a program, that
may have some general or frequent use." J. ROSENBERG, supra note 10, at 454.
190. Data East USA v. Epyx, 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[No copyright protection
granted to program] elements of expression that necessarily follow from an idea, or to 'scenes a
faire'... ."); see Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 616
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
The application of this doctrine to computer programs had been discussed well before the
decision in Lotus. See, e.g., Note, Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory: Copyright
Protection for the Structure and Sequence of Computer Programs, 21 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 255,
298-99 (1987).
191. Plains Cotton, 807 F.2d at 1260-61.
192. See, e.g., Frybarger v. IBM, 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987); Atari, Inc. v. North
Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880
(1982).
193. See, e.g., Apple Computer v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 (3d Cir.
1983) (programmer name embedded in one program and word "applesoft" embedded in an-
other found in defendant's program), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); SAS Inst. v. S & H
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this way, necessary expressions of common ideas are available to the pub-
lic supporting the policy behind the copyright laws, yet slavish copying
of another's work, even common routines, will remain protected.
If protection is to be limited in this manner, expert testimony is re-
quired for the trier of fact to recognize computer scenes afaire. The need
for expert testimony has already been recognized by the courts. Expert
testimony has been used for comparing the particular program at is-
sue. 94 Expert testimony has also been used to show that substantially
different expression can be created by a programmer from the same
idea."9 ' Indeed, as one court recognized, integrated tests of expert testi-
mony and analytic dissection of programs "may well be the wave of the
future. 196
C. Screen Display Infringement Should Require a Showing that the
Screen Conveys Information or Expression Not Necessary To
the Idea Being Conveyed
One of the most obvious aspects of the user interface is the screen
display. Courts have protected screen displays in some cases 19 7 and not
protected them in others.1 98 The decisive factor is whether the display
contains expression. 199 The problem is determining at what point the
screen display is more than just the conveyance of an idea.
A court should look to the screen displays and assess whether or not
Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816, 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (vestigial term from deleted opera-
tion in plaintiff's program found in defendant's program).
194. See, eg., E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (D. Minn. 1985).
The court, in a technical holding which included a glossary of terms, compared several facets
of the two programs made by experts and concluded that copied expression of the plaintiff's
program was not the "only and essential means" of expressing the underlying idea. Id. at
1502.
195. Id. at 1493. In Pearl Systems v. Competition Electronics, a programmer was hired to
write a timing program accomplishing the same goal as the defendant's program. 1988 Copy-
right L. Dec. (CCH) 26,338 (S.D. Fla. July 15, 1988). Without being informed of the plain-
tiff's program other than in the most general terms, the programmer independently developed
a program that did not infringe on the plaintiff's program-a result the court considered when
analyzing the "virtually identical" subroutines of the defendant's program. Id. at -.
196. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
197. See, eg., Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987); Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib.
Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. 1127.
198. See, eg., Plains Cotton Coop. v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th
Cir.), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987); Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y.
1985).
199. Synercom Technology v. University Computing, 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1011 (N.D. Tex.
1978) ("The litmus seems to be whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to
express.").
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they convey information that is not essential to the display itself. In
Manufacturers Technologies v. CAMS, Inc.,200 the court identified the
idea behind the screen display" 1 and then considered whether: (1) any
expression existed in that screen, and (2) if the expression found was a
necessary incident to that idea.2" The plaintiff in Manufacturers Tech-
nologies had created a program for calculating a cost estimation of
machining a part.2"3 An element of this program was an on-screen dis-
play of the user's prior selections while running an estimation.2° While
the "idea" of displaying prior selections or status was not copyrightable,
the expression, or selection and placement of what information would be
shown on the display, was not a necessary incident and thus could be
copyrightable.20 5 The court in Manufacturers Technologies held that a
screen prompting for information must also convey information for a
finding of copyrightable expression. 2'6 Limiting the breadth of protec-
tion of computer programs as a result of hardware constraints, the court
observed that the "screen page is only so long and so wide" and therefore
placement on the display screen is necessarily limited.20 7 The court ex-
plicitly denied protection to the use of particular terms or symbols on the
screen.
20 8
Having defined the expression, a court must then find the expression
can be separated from the idea being expressed.2 9 Indispensable expres-
sion should be protected only from virtually identical copying.210 A
court should consider whether the expression--or structure, sequence
and layout-of the screens is dictated by artistic or functional considera-
200. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
201. The idea was to apprise the user of the status of his or her efforts during the cost-
estimation of the machining of a part. Id. at 996.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 988.
204. Id. at 996. The program identified the operation or department utilized, the tooling
used in the department, and the type of material being used. Id.
205. Id. The court found, "That expression reflects selection as to what should be made
part of the status report, arrangement of the terms therein, assignment of numbers to specific
operations/departments and tools, and coordination in the manner of building on the status
report as the user progresses through various steps." Id.
206. Id. at 997; see also Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1012 (formats may by placement of lines,
shaded art, and words create copyrightable expression telling user what, where and how to
place data).
207. Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F. Supp. at 995.
208. Id. at 996 n.16.
209. See Frybarger v. IBM, 812 F.2d 525, 530 (9th Cir. 1987) (expression of idea based on
technical requirements of program is indispensable expression); Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at
1012 ("[Fjormats are copyrightable if the ideas they express are separable from their
expression.").
210. Frybarger, 812 F.2d at 530.
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tions. For example, choosing a typeface for display on the screen or par-
ticular wording of phrases expressing commands would ordinarily be
dictated by artistic or aesthetic factors and receive protection." On the
other hand, an alphabetic, two column display is a functional considera-
tion and should not receive protection.212
The court in Lotus failed to make a proper assessment of the screen
displays. In reviewing the menu command system, the Lotus court
found that a two-line moving cursor display was one of many ways of
expressing a menu system.213 This alone should not be a sufficient crite-
ria for determining copyrightability in view of the limited number of
ways of displaying a menu system.214 It appears from the holding of the
Lotus court that Paperback had infringed upon the expression of the 1-2-
3 menu by its near verbatim copying of the phrases displayed on the
screen.2" 5 This finding of infringement could properly be made without
unnecessarily granting a copyright monopoly to the first programmer us-
ing a two-line cursor.
D. Courts Should Consider Factors in the Marketplace,
in Limited Instances
There is an important reason why computer programs should not be
compared to a stage play when searching for the extraction of expression
from idea.2 16 Enjoyment of one play is independent of other plays-it is
difficult to define a "learning curve" for the public to enjoy a play. Com-
puter programs, however, are unique among the works afforded copy-
right protection because they require some degree of "learning" before
utilization.
The consumer's greatest investment in computer software is not in
the software itself, but rather in the time and money involved in learning
211. Broderbund Software v. Unison World, 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1986)
(court followed such analysis in clearly defining expression and idea).
212. Manufacturers Technologies, 706 F. Supp. at 996.
213. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass. 1990).
214. The Lotus court found a two-line cursor and the spelling of menu commands to be
original expression of a menu command system. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying
text. More appropriate is the finding of Manufacturers Technologies that "[t]he use of colum-
nar format and the use of both upper and lower case letters are not sufficient on their own to
warrant copyright protection because they lack originality." Manufacturers Technologies, 706
F. Supp. at 998; cf. Digital Communications, 659 F. Supp. at 459 (1987) (use of command
driven program-typing of two symbols or letters-non-protectable idea yet capitalization or
highlighting of those letters is protected expression).
215. Lotus, 740 F. Supp. at 86-87.
216. See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text.
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to use it properly.2 17 Protecting the user interface of a program, particu-
larly after it has become a "standard," can block the continued work of
other programmers.2 s Consumers would be unwilling to endure, again,
the time and expense involved in complete retraining for the use of a new
program-in effect, the public would be "check-mated" by the original
copyright holder.219
Copyright does not absolutely preclude an author from referring to
and relying upon prior published material.220 In fact, courts must occa-
sionally subordinate the interest of the copyright holder to that of the
public in order to meet the constitutional purpose of copyright protec-
tion-development of art, science and industry.221 If it appears that
granting protection to the expression could exhaust all possibilities of
future use of the subject matter, copyright protection should not be
granted.
222
The legal test and analysis used by the Lotus court overlooks this
overriding consideration. Concern over the breadth of the Lotus holding
has been expressed within the computer industry.223 Software program-
mers, the very population that allegedly is being protected, have formed
at least one organization to oppose copyright protection of software in
light of the court's decisions.2 24 The Lotus court went to great lengths
to support its dismissal of Paperback's argument that programs are
"built" upon each other, and those "building blocks" should not be af-
forded copyright protection.22 5 Historically, both case precedent and the
217. Currid, Training Won't Cure a Case of Bad Technology, PC WEEK, Mar. 18, 1991, at
70.
218. A common user interface will benefit both users, allowing them to learn only one set of
commands, and programmers, allowing them to focus on innovative developments. Kay,
Group Protests Copyright Law, LAN TIMES, Sept. 1990, at 40.
219. Ironically, the newest release of Lotus 1-2-3 (Release 3.1 (1990)) utilizes another pro-
gram to allow for capabilities that are popular in the marketplace. One reviewer noted:
"[T]here's one hitch. You now have two separate menu systems to master [when utilizing the
new Lotus 1-2-3 program.]" Stinson, First Looks, PC MAG., Nov. 13, 1990, at 33, 34.
220. Rosemont Enters. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303, 310 (2d Cir. 1966) ("It is just
such wasted effort that the proscription against the copyright of ideas and facts, and to a lesser
extent the privilege of fair use, are designed to prevent."), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
221. Id. at 307.
222. See Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble, 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st Cir. 1967) ("We cannot
recognize copyright as a game of chess in which the public can be check-mated.").
223. See, eg., Dvorak, The Death of Code, PC MAO., Nov. 13, 1990, at 81; Litigious
Software Industry Needs Taming, PC WEEK, July 16, 1990, at 55; Seymour, Lotus vs. Borland
Upshot: Customer Intimidation?, PC WEEK, July 23, 1990, at 15.
224. See Kay, supra note 218, at 40.
225. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990) (court
discussed this under the section of the "OTSOG" principle-"On The Shoulders Of Giants").
Contrary to the dismissal of this concept with regard to Paperback's program expressed at this
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consideration of this issue by the CONTU Commission indicates the Lo-
tus court was incorrect.226 Elements of the user interface should be ana-
lyzed individually for protectable elements of expression. A list of
contents or ingredients is not subject to copyright protection-they are
necessarily incident to the idea that they express and are dictated by
those functional considerations. 227 Yet the court granted protection to 1-
2-3's menu command structure because it considered functional choices
the user would make and was not just based on the alphabet as was Visi-
Calc's menu.228 The Lotus 1-2-3 menu/screen displays do not provide
information; to the contrary, they are arranged in a fashion dictated by
function 229 and should not have been afforded protection.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress should adopt the Commission's suggestion that software
copyright protection be reviewed periodically.230 An evaluation of the
protection currently provided by a re-convened Commission would allow
a detailed consideration of judicial rulings and legislative amendments to
the 1976 Copyright Act that affect software copyright. The results of
such an analysis can then be used by the legislature to decide whether
their goals are being achieved, or if the subject matter has created issues
that can best be solved through a suis generis statute.231
New authors of computer software should be satisfied that their
work will be protected, but the balance between the protection of expres-
sion and encouragement of new works is extremely delicate. The legisla-
ture, in its most recent consideration of computer software copyright,
232
recognized the important position software occupies with today's pub-
portion of the opinion, the court previously stated that elements of Lotus' program, 1-2-3,
"could thus be thought of as an evolutionary product that was built upon the shoulders of
VisiCalc." Id. at 66.
226. See supra notes 20-69 and accompanying text.
227. Manufacturers Technologies v. CAMS, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 984, 996 (D. Conn. 1989).
228. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
229. The court found the submenus presented "a list of up to about ten full-word menu
choices, presented in order of predicted frequency of use rather than alphabetically." Lotus,
740 F. Supp. at 67.
230. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
231. In developing a new copyright law, China looked to the United States copyright stat-
ute as a model for much of its new statute. Sobel, Panel 4: Technological Transfer and Protec-
tion of Intellectual Property in China, 12 Loy. L.A. IN'rL & CoMP. L.J. 61, 66 (1989).
Finding this law inadequate for the protection of software, China departed from the United
States "model" and created a separate statute for software protection. Id. at 66-67.
232. Computer Software Rental Amendments Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 801-
805, 104 Stat. 5089, 5134 (1990) (to be codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 109).
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liC. 2 33 The legislature also recognized the intrinsic utilitarian purpose of
software234 and the desire of some authors to allow, with minor con-
straints, the use of their original programs.
235
Through a misapplication of law, the Lotus court found that Paper-
back Software violated the copyright on Lotus' 1-2-3 program. In so
doing, the court failed to recognize several factors unique to computer
software and granted copyright protection to the program's "user inter-
face" without identifying protectable expression.
If the courts: (1) recognize that programs express several ideas, (2)
rule out non-protectable "routine" or standard elements of programming
from the remaining expression, and (3) consider the implications for fu-
ture program creation the grant of a copyright monopoly will have, then
new authors will properly be protected, new work will be encouraged,
and it will be easier for programmers to recognize what may be an in-
fringement of other programs without litigating each program.
Courts for the most part have done an admirable job applying legal
paradigms-grounded in the arts-to a highly technologic field. How-
ever, periodic review by commissions representative of each affected area
will keep derailing opinions such as Lotus Development Corp. v. Paper-
back Software International 2 36 on track. Until such time, this opinion
will hopefully remain a unique aberration from the proper scope of com-
puter software copyright.
Craig A. Laidig
233. "Computers have become commonplace in government, our homes and offices, and
business enterprises. Software-the technology that makes computers work-is of pivotal im-
portance to the United States, which is the world's leader in this unique form of creativity."
H.R. REP. No. 735, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4, reprinted in 1990 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 6935, 6935.
234. Id. at 6939.
235. Id. at 6947-48.
236. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
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